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Bangladesh, one of the world’s poorest countries, is prone to largescale natural disasters with consequent impact on human health and
survival because of its geographical location and topographical features.
Poverty, demographic pressure and rapid urbanization are forcing a vast
majority of people to migrate to high risk areas (e.g. flood plains and
islands). The vulnerability is further exacerbated by the increasing threat
of a rising sea level. In 1998, Bangladesh experienced the “flood of the
century” and households exposed to this flood had major crop failure,
suffered from various water-borne diseases, lost shelter, assets and ability
to meet their basic needs. Based on multiple rounds of household survey
data from rural Bangladesh collected after the 1998 flooding, this paper
investigates the factors that contribute to reducing sickness shocks after a
massive natural disaster. Of particular interest, we take advantage of the
well-known joint liability scheme of microfinance programs offered by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to investigate if such a scheme
reduces sickness shocks after a major natural disaster. The microfinance
program initiated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is considered a
major innovation in the credit delivery system. In offering credit to the
poor, it has largely replaced the traditional system of physical collateral
requirement with group responsibility (the group members are mutual
granters of each other). The successful model of group-based credit
delivery system encouraged many NGOs to introduce similar programs.
The role of group-based microfinance program in coping with natural
disasters is yet to be explored. There are some preliminary discussions on
exploring the pathways through which microfinance may affect the
recovery from natural disasters, but it still lacks empirical investigations.
The degree of post-disaster recovery is significantly affected by the
incidence of sickness. On the other hand, borrowers under a group-based
microfinance program have incentive to provide mutual insurance by
exchanging health-related information (e.g., use of oral re-hydration
therapy, avoiding contaminated water, taking vaccination immediately),
preventive medicine (e.g. water purification pills), loans to cover instant
medical expenses, networks of personalized contacts with health workers
and doctors, as well as by providing nursing and sharing the workload for
those who fall ill. Motivated by some earlier theoretical studies, we
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empirically investigate if there is any evidence of mutual insurance due to
joint liability scheme of microfinance programs in the face of a massive
natural disaster shock. We use a panel data set compiled from household
surveys conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI). The data was collected from 757 households in rural areas in
Bangladesh at three points in time over a period of a year following the
1998 flood. Households were selected through a stratified random
sampling, and survey responses included households’ income,
consumption expenditure, number of sick days, medical expenditure,
assets, credit availability, and household level flood exposure. Empirical
analysis indicates that microfinance programs may provide an informal
mutual insurance mechanism to reduce sickness shocks. This result holds
after addressing the potential selectivity bias due to nonrandom placement
of microfinance programs. Simply put, panel data analysis reveals that
households participated in microfinance programs suffer less from
sickness. Thus, group-based microfinance program has the ability (though
may be partially) to provide peer monitoring and mutual insurance in
times of sickness after a major natural disaster.
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